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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES L. THOMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.990437-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for willful evasion of income tax, a second 
degree felony, and making a false tax return, a third degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Was evidence that defendant boasted about his ability to avoid paying 
taxes, obscured his wages by taking the majority of them in third-party 
checks, attempted to have the 1099 reporting those checks as income 
"zeroed out," succeeded in having the 1099 reduced below the figures 
recorded in his own ledger, and then claimed business expenses for a 
non-existent business sufficient to support the finding that his conduct 
was intentional and willful? 
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and 
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that 'the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."5 State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 
f 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)). 
II. Was the trial court required to give defendant's good faith instruction 
where the jury's instructions defining intent were inconsistent with a 
finding of good faith? 
"Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes 
error is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, If 11, 17P.3d 1153. 
III. Should this Court reject defendant's claim that the trial court 
improperly denied his motion for new trial where defendant relies on 
grounds not preserved below? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
IV. Is a new trial required because one witness's testimony was unrecorded 
due to a malfunction in the recording device where this Court granted 
the State's unchallenged motion to supplement the record with an 
affidavit from that witness? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following dispositive statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401; 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103; 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1101. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 23, 1998, defendant was charged by information with one count each of 
willful evasion of income tax, a second degree felony, and making a false tax return, a 
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third degree felony, in connection with his 1996 state income tax returns (R. 3-5). After a 
four-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 182-84). Defendant was 
sentenced to zero-to-five years for filing a false tax return and one-to-fifteen years for 
willful evasion of income tax (R. 182). Defendant's sentences were suspended and 
defendant was ordered to serve twenty days in jail, pay a $15,000 fine, and serve seventy-
two months on probation (R. 182-84). Defendant's motion for new trial was denied 
without a hearing (R. 213-16). Defendant timely appealed (R. 217-18). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After working for Neways, Inc. for four or five months, defendant, as corporate 
counsel, arranged for his salary to be cut to one-third of his actual wages and for the 
remainder of his compensation to be paid by way of third-party checks to himself and 
various bill collectors (Tr. 47). According to a friend defendant recruited to join the 
company a few months later, defendant explained that "one of the advantages" of 
working for Neways "would be that I would be able to earn all of my income tax-free" 
(Tr. 44-45). Defendant encouraged the new employee to take his wages in the same way 
defendant did as "a way I could avoid taxes" (Tr. 47). Defendant explained that he kept 
track of his additional income by maintaining a ledger in which he detailed the checks 
paid by Neways on his behalf (Tr. 58-59; St. Exh. 1). 
However, when defendant received an IRS form 1099 from Neways reflecting 
those third-party payments, he angrily but unsuccessfully demanded that the 1099 be 
3 
"zeroed out" because "the deal" was that "he would be paid a certain W-2 income and 
that the rest wouldn't show up anywhere" (Tr. 68, 106,175). He then worked with 
Neways owner Dee Mower to reduce the 1099 total by omitting some of the third-party 
payments despite their being included in his ledger (Tr. 353, 367, 392; St. Exh. 1, 20). 
In addition to these revisions on his 1099, defendant further lowered his taxable 
income by claiming business expenses on his federal tax return for a non-existent 
business (Tr. 197-99, 262-63, 291-94). As defendant explained to his friend, despite 
having to claim the 1099 income, he nonetheless "managed to whittle [his taxes] down 
quite a bit" by being "creative" (Tr. 70). 
Although a full-time employee of Neways, when confronted by an investigator for 
the Utah State Tax Commission, defendant claimed he worked only part-time for the 
company and that he had few other billable hours (Tr. 199-200). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Where defendant boasted about his ability to avoid paying taxes, obscured 
his salary by taking the majority of it in third-party checks, succeeded in reducing the 
amount of those checks he would have to claim as income, and then claimed business 
expenses for a non-existent business, the evidence was sufficient to find that he 
intentionally and willfully evaded taxes and filed a false income tax return. 
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Issue II. The trial court was not required to give defendant's proposed good faith 
instruction where the trial court's multiple instructions on intent ensured that defendant 
would not be convicted if he acted in good faith. 
Issue III. Most of the issues now raised to challenge the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion for new trial were not raised below. Thus, they are not properly 
before this Court. The only issue that was raised in defendant's motion below—that a 
witness gave inconsistent testimony—was waived when defendant failed to object to that 
witness's testimony at trial. Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue IV. The loss of one witness's testimony due to a recording malfunction does 
not require reversal where this Court granted the State's uncontested motion to 
supplement the record with that witness's affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT BOASTED ABOUT HIS ABILITY 
TO AVOID PAYING TAXES, OBSCURED HIS SALARY BY 
TAKING MOST OF IT IN THIRD-PARTY CHECKS, HAD HIS 1099 
REDUCED BELOW FIGURES RECORDED IN HIS OWN LEDGER, 
AND THEN CLAIMED BUSINESS EXPENSES FOR A NON-
EXISTENT BUSINESS WAS SUFFICIENT TO FIND THAT HIS 
CONDUCT WAS INTENTIONAL AND WILLFUL. 
Defendant claims that his convictions should be reversed because "the evidence 
presented at trial established only that the defendant relied on the W-2 and 1099 tax 
statements prepared for him by Neways." Aplt. Br. at 18. Thus, according to defendant, 
5 
the "State failed to prove that [he] acted in a willful or intentional manner" in committing 
the tax violations. Aplt. Br. at 17,18. 
Section 76-8-1101 of the Utah Code provides, in relevant part: 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement 
of Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax 
Commission,... makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false 
or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax 
or the payment thereof is . . . guilty of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(9)(c), (d) 
(1996). Under section 76-2-103(1), a person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1999). 
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and 
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that 'the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 
K 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)). 
A. Because defendant has failed to carry his marshaling burden, 
this Court should refuse to consider this claim. 
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant "'must first marshal all 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even 
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viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict.'" State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, % 25, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 
819 (Utah App. 1994)). Here, defendant carries none of that burden with regard to 
business deductions he claimed for a non-existent business. 
In his brief, defendant acknowledges that Becky MacKenzie, an auditor with the 
Utah State Tax Commission, "testified that wages could not be reported on a Schedule C 
and that a taxpayer cannot take a business deduction against wages for a vehicle, 
advertising, office expenses or utility payments." Aplt. Br. at 10. 
However, defendant fails to marshal the evidence indicating that this is exactly 
what defendant did. Specifically, defendant fails to marshal the following evidence: that 
Schedule C is a federal income tax form on which a taxpayer records deductible business 
expenses (Tr. 197); that defendant filed a Schedule C with his federal income tax return 
on which he claimed advertising expenses, car and truck expenses, office expenses, taxes 
and licenses expenses, travel and entertainment expenses, utility expenses, wage expenses 
and document framing expenses for a total of $16,998.55 in business expenses (St. Exh. 
3); that Ned Shimizu, a criminal investigator with the Utah State Tax Commission, 
checked with the State Department of Commerce and with the Tax Commission to 
determine whether defendant had a business and found nothing (Tr. 197-98); that the 
business address listed on the Schedule C was a rented mail box (Tr. 199); that the only 
car listed with the State as belonging to defendant or his family was a 1972 Honda Civic 
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for which the registration had expired in 1994 (Tr. 210, 249); that defendant drove a 
Landrover provided by Neways for both personal and business use (Tr. 70-71); that 
Becky MacKenzie testified that one cannot claim a deduction for use of an employer's car 
(Tr. 262); that defendant claimed wage expenses but had no withholding account and the 
State received no W-2's for those wages (Tr. 291-94); that the utility expenses defendant 
claimed were suspect because there were no rent expenses and no expenses for a home 
business (Tr. 293-94); that, after defendant filed his income tax returns, he told his co-
worker, Allen Davis, that he had been "creative" and had "managed to whittle [his taxes] 
down quite a bit" (Tr. 70); that defendant was a full-time employee of Neways in 1996 
but told Shimizu that he worked only part-time, about 20 hours, and had very few billable 
hours on the side (Tr. 73, 92, 98, 134,185, 200; State Exh. 2). 
In addition to not marshaling this evidence, defendant fails to "demonstrate how 
this evidence . . . is insufficient to support the verdict[s].'" Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 
at f 25 (quoting Strain, 885 P.2d at 819). Instead, defendant focuses solely on the 
evidence concerning his 1099. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14, 15-22. 
On appeal, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence concerning 
his intent to commit the crimes for which he was convicted. See Aplt. Br. at 15-22. 
Because evidence of his conduct surrounding his Schedule C is highly probative of that 
intent, defendant's failure to marshal this evidence defeats his insufficiency claim. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, at 125. 
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B. Evidence that defendant gloated about his ability to avoid paying 
taxes, arranged payment of his salary to disguise his income, 
convinced Neways' owner to reduce his 1099 income below that 
recorded in his own ledger, and then claimed non-existent 
business expenses support the jury's finding that his conduct 
was willful and intentional. 
Defendant asserts that because "[tjhere are few, if any, Utah appellate decisions 
construing the statutes under which the defendant was charged," this Court should look to 
federal case law "as to how the elements of the Utah statutes should be construed with 
respect to the elements of intent and willfulness." Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Defendant then 
claims that because the federal standard requires proof of a specific intent to violate the 
law, "it is apparent that the State failed to prove that the defendant acted in a willful or 
intentional manner." Aplt. Br. at 17. 
However, "intent" and "willfulness" are defined terms within the criminal code. 
Thus, defendant's reliance on federal case law is misplaced. Moreover, in addition to not 
marshaling the evidence of his improper Schedule C deductions, defendant misrepresents 
the evidence concerning his attempts to have his original 1099 reduced. The evidence, as 
properly presented, supports defendant's convictions. 
1. The statutory definitions of "intentionally" and 
"willfully" apply to Utah's tax evasion statutes. 
Defendant claims that the definition of the "elements of intent and willfulness" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1999) "is a question of first impression in this state" 
because "[t]here are few, if any, Utah appellate decisions construing the statutes under 
9 
which the defendant has been charged." Aplt. Br. at 16. However, because those statutes 
merely require this Court to apply terms already defined by the legislature, this Court's 
function involves nothing more than application of the traditional rules of statutory 
construction. 
'"[T]he power to define crimes and fix the punishment for those crimes is vested 
in the legislature.'" State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, \ 13, 21 P.3d 249 (quoting State 
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988)); see also State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1206 
(Utah App. 1992) ("[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, holds the power to defines crimes 
and to fix any punishment for those crimes."). Thus, this Court has no power to rewrite a 
statute and "'will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.'" 
J J. W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,1f 17, 430 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quoting Arrendondo v. 
Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29,112, 24 P.3d 928). 
Rather, this Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^ j 25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen & 
Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, f 14, 29 P.3d 650. In doing so, 
this Court "assume[s] that each term in a statute was used advisedly." Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1998). Therefore, this Court 
"presume[s] that when the Legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in the 
10 
same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning." State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 
(Utah 1992) (discussing need to adhere to statutory definition of "intentionally"). 
Here, defendant was charged with violating section 76-8-1101(b) and (c). Those 
provisions provide: 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement 
of Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax 
Commission,... makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false 
or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony.... 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax 
or the payment thereof is . . . guilty of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(9)(c), (d) 
( ). Thus, to find defendant guilty under subsection (b), the State had to prove that 
defendant intended to evade either a tax or tax-related requirement when he filed his false 
tax return. To find defendant guilty under subsection (c), the State had to prove that 
defendant acted willfully when he attempted to evade or defeat a tax or payment thereof 
when he attempted to hide some of his income. 
Both of these intents are defined in section 76-2-103(1) (1995). Under section 76-
2-103(1), a person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) 
(1995). 
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Therefore, to convict defendant under section 76-8-1101(b), the State had to prove 
that defendant had a conscious objective or desire to evade either a tax or a tax-related 
requirement when he filed his false tax return. To convict him under section 76-8-
1101(c), the State had to prove that defendant had a conscious objective or desire to 
evade taxes or payment thereof when he arranged to have the majority of his wages taken 
in third-party checks and then attempted to have the 1099 recording those checks reduced. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, in neither case did the State have to also prove that 
defendant acted with a specific intent to violate the law. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1358 n.3 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[t]o act willfully . . .means to act deliberately 
and purposefully" in committing the act but "does not require an intent to violate the 
law"). 
2. The evidence is sufficient to find defendant acted 
intentionally and willfully in attempting to evade payment 
of income tax and in filing a false income tax return. 
Defendant claims that the State did not show that defendant acted "willfully" in 
evading taxes because its own witnesses "unanimous[ly] testified] . . . that the defendant 
had no impact on the amounts that Neways included or excluded in the 1099s other than 
making his full records completely available to its accountants and owners." Aplt. Br. at 
21. However, in addition to not marshaling the evidence of his improper Schedule C 
deductions, defendant misrepresents the evidence concerning his attempts to have his 
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original 1099 reduced. The evidence, as properly presented, supports defendant's 
convictions. 
Just a few months after beginning his employ at Neways, defendant arranged for 
his recorded income to be reduced to one-third of his actual salary and for the remainder 
of his salary to be paid through third-party checks (Tr. 47). Defendant kept track of what 
Neways owed him and paid on his behalf in a ledger (Tr. 59-60; St. Exh. 1). 
When defendant recruited Allen Davis to work for Neways a few months later, he 
told Davis that "one of the advantages . . . would be that [he] would be able to earn all of 
[his] income tax-free" (Tr. 44,47). He also talked with Davis about using off-shore 
banks as another means to get money without "rais[ing] any flags" because the money 
would not be traceable (Tr. 46).l 
In early 1997, defendant received a miscellaneous compensation form 1099 from 
Neways reflecting the third-party payments made on his behalf in 1996 (Tr. ). 
Defendant was "furious" because "[t]hat was not the deal" (Tr. 68, 141, 192). Defendant 
claimed the "deal" was that "he would be paid a certain W-2 income and that the rest 
wouldn't show up anywhere" (Tr. 106). 
Although defendant claims this evidence was "unsubstantiated innuendo of 
unproven schemes" admitted only to "inflamef] the jury," Aplt. Br. at 12, 22, evidence 
that defendant contemplated such schemes was relevant to defendant's intent at the time 
he had the 1099 total reduced and filed his 1996 income tax return. 
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Defendatnt thus ordered Neways payroll accountant Annette Jenkins—the same 
person he had recently caught embezzling funds—to "zero-out" the 1099 (Tr. 69,175). 
When owner Dee Mower informed him that outside counsel had advised her that a 1099 
had to issue, defendant worked with Mower to reduce the 1099 amount (Tr. 107, 367, 
392; St. Exh. 16). Mower agreed to remove certain amounts from defendant's 1099, 
despite the fact that several of those amounts were recorded as third-party payments made 
on defendant's behalf in defendant's own ledger (Tr. 392; St. Exh. 1, 20). Minimizing 
the 1099 amount was "very important" to defendant and it "took quite awhile before it 
was finally reduced a certain amount to where he would accept it" (Tr. 70). 
Finally, despite Davis's telling defendant that the revised 1099 was now 
inaccurate, defendant used it to file his 1996 income tax returns (Tr. 96). In addition, as 
noted above, defendant claimed numerous business deductions for a non-existent business 
and then bragged to Davis that he had "managed to whittle [his taxes] down quite a bit" 
by getting "creative" (Tr. 70-71,197-99, 210,249, 262,291-94; St. Exh. 3). Then, 
although defendant was a full-time employee of Neways, he told Tax Commission 
investigator Shimizu that, in 1996, he worked only part-time, about 20 hours, and had 
very few billable hours on the side (Tr. 73, 92, 98, 134, 185, 200; State Exh. 2). 
This evidence is sufficient to show that defendant intended to evade a tax or tax 
requirement when he filed his false tax return and that he willfully attempted to evade 
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payment of taxes when he arranged to have his salary paid through third-party checks and 
then worked to have his 1099 reduced. 
Consequently, defendant's in si ill u'i ciu'> claim fails 
TEE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE A GOOD 
FAITH INSTRUCTION WHERE THE JURY'S INSTRUCTIONS 
DEFINING INTENT WERE INCONSISTENT WITH A FINDING OF 
GOOD FAITH. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposal insh urtion 
that "[i]f the Defendant had H JJOIHI faith hv I id' thai the information received on the 1099 
was accurate, you may not find [] him guilty." Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing R. 137; Def. 
Proposed Jury Instr. 5). Defendant claims that "the failure to give instructions with 
respect to a defendant's good faith reliance on an accountant or Him v\pvii constitutes 
reversible erroi V|> 11 Bi n ' M« it my fi\ e feclemt circuit court cases). However, the 
trial"'OIII 1 properly rejected defendant's proposed instruction because its substance was 
properly covered in other instructions. 
Although a defendant is entitled to have the jury r 
crime if there is a "basis in the evidence to suppor t that theory," State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 495 (Utah App. 1992), a trial court "does not err by refusing a [defendant's] 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions," State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal qi iotation marks 
omitted), aff'd, 937 V <d 4? S«I (tah 1998); see also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1231 (Utah 1998). "Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error 
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only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party 
or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT 
App. 13, f 17, 17 P.3d 1153 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f^ 17, a communications fraud and racketeering 
case not even cited in defendant's brief, the defendants claimed that the trial court "erred 
by refusing to give a good faith instruction in the context of the communications fraud 
charges." To support their argument, defendants relied on a body of federal case law—as 
defendant does here—holding that "'general instructions on willfulness and intent are 
insufficient to fully and clearly convey a defendant's good faith defense to the jury.5" Id. 
at 118 (quoting United States v. Haddock, 956 F,2d 1534, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
This Court rejected the defendants' argument, noting that the federal case law on 
which they relied reflected a "minority position." Id. at f 19-20. Instead, this Court 
adopted the "reasoning of the majority" of jurisdictions and held that "if a jury instruction 
'already contains a specific statement of the government's burden to prove [that the 
accused acted knowingly and willfully], the good faith instruction is simply a redundant 
version of the instruction on those elements.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Gross, 961 
F.2d 1097, 1103 (3rd Cir. 1992)). Under such circumstances, a separate good faith 
instruction is not required because "'a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly 
and willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith.'" Id. at 
U 20 (quoting Gross, 961 F.2d at 1103). "'By giving a detailed instruction on the 
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elements nl the aunt; wild whirli [defendants] w[ere] charged, the court ensured that a 
(in v finding of good faith would lead to acquittal.'" Id. (quoting Gross, 961 Kid at 1 I lrt) 
(brackets in original); see a/so United States v. Pomponio. n) | pci 
curiam) (holding, in tax case, that whc . e (>\ i r t * • -J * r i ct[s] the jury on 
willfulness[5 ajn iddilional iiisti nation s good faith [is] unnecessary"); Cheeks v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (same); United States v. Evangelista, 122 F.3d 11 
n.5(2dCir. 1997); United States v. Brimberry, 961 K2J I2K<>, J*) I (7Ml(/ir 1<><>2); /./w/<v/ 
States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d I'M I*) * I')11' C\x I WO): ( ">I//IY/ „V/a/(^  v. 5/wie, 431 F.2d 
1286, 1289 ^i i 'M^'C'V VHO). 
Here, in connection with the charge of filing a false tax return, the jury was 
instructed that it could convict defendant only if it found that he made , 
intentional attempt, act or omission, to • ^ i . • >;, that he had "a 
voluntary, conscious (Jcsiic t< > engage in conduct that is a violation of a known legal 
duty"; and that he "acted or failed to [act] when the law required him to act voluntarily 
and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something he knew tin h\\\ piohihieci" 
(R. 70; Addendum B). 
i 11 '. • 11111 ii i • 11 'i > 11 w i f 11 (11 c charge of willfully evading a tax, the jury was instructed 
that it could convict defendant only if it found that he "knew and understood that. , he 
owed more Utah State Income Tax . , and then tried in some way to ;ivoid thai additional 
tax"(R. 80; Addendum Ii) dial \w "had actual kiatwli dj»c that his conduct was wrongful" 
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(R. 81; Addendum B); and that he committed "a voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited,... 
that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to disregard the law" (R. 82; Addendum B). 
In addition, the jury was instructed that defendant's conduct was "not willful" if he 
acted out "of negligence (even gross negligence), inadvertence, accident, mistake, or 
reckless disregard for the requirements of the law, or due to his honest misunderstanding 
of the requirements of the law" (R. 74; Addendum B); and that, "[t]o find the Defendant 
guilty of either of the crimes . . . , it is not enough to show merely that a lesser tax was 
paid than was due, nor is negligent, careless, or unintentional understatement of income 
sufficient" (R. 87; Addendum B). 
Under these instructions, "'a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly 
and willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith.'" 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f^ 20 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Ervasti, 
201 F.3d 1029, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding "good faith" instruction was not necessary 
because "jury could not have found [defendant] guilty unless it believed she willfully 
violated the tax laws and, thus, did not act in a good-faith misapprehension of the law"). 
Thus, no additional instruction on good faith was required, and defendant's claim 
fails. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 23; Cheeks, 498 U.S. at 201; Pomponio, 97 S. Ct. at 
24; Dorotich, 900 F.2d at 193; Stone, 431 F.2d at 1289 & n.9. 
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m i s COURT SHUUJLD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT RELIES ON GROUNDS NOT 
PRESERVED BELOW. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied Ins motn m for \w \ dial, 
because "the State utilized perjured trsl in iunv \h\ Mien Davis] to establish the 
fou n 1.1; 11111 n I (>r 1 i ie ledger allegedly created by the defendant," "Davis's presence 
throughout this case [was] substantially marked by subtle manipulation of fact and 
witnesses and general skullduggery," and there was "apparent collusion between I )avis 
and the prosecutor" which was "conipvMinded" In the prosecutor's subsequently replacing 
defendant as Neways' corporate counsel. Aplt. Br. at 24, 25,27. However, defendant's 
claim is not adequately briefed. Moreover, because none of the grounds defendant now 
raises were preserved below, this Court should refuse to considei I he in 
A. Proceedings below. 
At trial, Allen Davis testified that he received a copy of defendant's ledger from 
his secretary, Angie Howell, perhaps in February 1997 (Tr. 50, 52). Davis later testified 
that he made a photocopy of the ledger on the day defendant was terminated in either late 
June or early July I *>y 7 ( 11 S v56). 
Although defendant stated in his motion for new trial that, "prior to [Davis's] 
testimony,... [the prosecutor] represented to the defendant that Allen Davis received 
[the] ledger.. . from the defendant's wife after she had been InMten hv delend.ini' IR. 
190), defendant i lever cross-examined Davis oi i that issue nor objected to Davis's 
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testimony on the ground that it was potentially inconsistent with the prosecutor's pre-trial 
statements. Rather, when the State attempted to have a copy of the ledger admitted as 
State's Exhibit 1, defendant objected only because Davis "indicated originally that he 
received this document in February of 1997 and he then changed his story and said, no, 
I—I photocopied it when he—when Mr. Thompson left in July of 1997" (Tr. 57). 
In his motion for new trial, defendant made only one claim in connection with 
Davis's testimony. Specifically, defendant claimed that Davis "committed perjury... 
when he testified that he had found [defendant's] ledger in the Defendant's desk" because 
the prosecutor had previously told defendant that "Davis received [the] ledger . . . from 
the defendant's wife after she had been beaten by defendant" (R. 186, 187, 190, 194). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion without opinion or a hearing (R. 213-
16). 
B. This Court should reject defendant's claims because they are not 
properly briefed. 
Under rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant's brief 
must contain an argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
"Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989); State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997). This Court "is 
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entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply 
a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Helmick, 2000T T' » • -
quotation marks omitted); sec n v,; t V { ^ i r . J 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996). 
I fiali COIIM.S lt;n < • consistently refused to consider issues that have not been adequately 
briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05; State v. Yates, 834 l\2d 599,, 602 {I Mali App. 
1992); see alsoMacKayv. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-4"! I Mali I »W), !J<//*<r w U S 
Gen.,Inc., 916 I" M 1>(H. W(»S (I 'tali lw<>). /f/////v r Summerhays, 927P.2d 197, 198 
(Utaf i App. 1996). 
Here, defendant provides no legal analysis or record support for Ins claims. 
Although defendant cites to Walker v. State, 624 K M <>K 7 (I Jtah 19X1 KtiuUniy (I*M1 mew 
trial was required where Stall w as awaiv of itunviicitt*" ,md misleading testimony harmful 
to flefciise but tinted to disclose it), he fails to explain how Davis's testimony in this case 
constituted perjury under Walker or, even if Davis's explanation of how he came to 
possess the ledger was false, how this false testimony was groin id foi a, new trial See 
Thomas, 961 I' 111 i i f W M '' 11 n p I! u I h i i lie 24(a ^  « • quires not just bald citation to 
aulliontv hut development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority."); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) (holding that, to warrant new 
trial, evidence of perjury must be such that it coi ( must 
not be "merely cumulative," a? 10 render a different result probable on 
21 
the retrial of the case"); State v. Mildenhall, 141 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987) (holding that, 
to warrant new trial based on false testimony, defendant must show that the statements 
were made "with the belief that they were not true" and that there is "a reasonable 
likelihood that the testimony could have substantially affected the verdict"). 
Similarly, defendant provides no legal support for his claims that Davis's alleged 
"skullduggery" or his alleged friendly relationship with the prosecutor constitute bases for 
a new trial. See Helmick, 2000 UT 70, at f^ 7 (holding appellate court "is not a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"); Vigil, 
922P.2dat25. 
Finally, defendant's argument does not contain a single citation to the record. See 
Aplt. Br. at 24-28. Moreover, most of defendant's allegations are completely without 
record support. See, e.g. Aplt. Br. at 26 (allegation that Allen burglarized materials from 
defendant's home); id. (allegation that Allen "worked behind the scenes to ensure that 
no one at Neways communicated with [defendant]"); Aplt. Br. at 27 (allegation that 
prosecutor knew Neways and Davis were being investigated for federal tax crimes and 
that defendant was witness therein); id. (allegation that prosecutor accepted defendant's 
former position as Neways' corporate counsel). See further discussion below at 
Subpoint C. 
Because defendant's claims are inadequately briefed, this Court should refuse to 
consider them. 
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(J. Defendant cannot challenge the trial court's denial of his motion 
for new trial on grounds not raised below for which there is no 
record support. 
"1 Ms [Cjouri is not tin- [inipn Imum lo mtei tain what is, in effect, amotion for a 
newwial" State v Kinder, 14 Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82, 84 (1963). Thus, an issue not 
raised in a motion for new trial before the trial court "cannot be considered here foi the; 
first time." State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 7M, 7M (Utah I0M), sec also Sian \ Hates, f>;\? 
P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982); State w Smith, 11U P 2d 929, 930 n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
This is particularly so where defendant's failure to raise a claim below renders the 
record insufficient to review the claim on appeal. See State v. Litherland, J000 1 1 76, *f 
17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Appellants bear the burden of proof \v ilh respect to flicn appeals,, 
including the burdens of attending the preservation and presentation of the record."); 
Star Wulffenstein, o / P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) ("When a defendant predicates error 
to this Court, he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation with an 
adequate record."). Where defendant raises an issue that "was not i aisetl lor 
determination by * ppeai m the record[,] . . . defendant's 
assignment ol error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing] court has no 
power to determine." Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292-93. 
Here, defendant never claimed before (lie dial louil l(i;i( "Paxils presence 
throughou \\u any marked by subtle manipulation of fact and 
witnesses and general skullduggery" or that there was an "apparent collusion between 
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Davis and the prosecutor." Aplt. Br. at 25, 27. Thus, these issues are raised for the first 
time on appeal, and this Court should refuse to consider them. Fierst, 692 P.2d at 753; 
Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Kinder, 381 P.2d at 84; Smith, 776 P.2d at 930 n.l. 
Moreover, because defendant failed to raise these claims below, nothing currently 
exists in the record to support them. For this reason also, defendant's claims fail. See 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292-93. 
D. Although defendant raised his perjury claim in his motion for 
new trial, he waived that claim by not objecting to Davis's 
testimony at trial. 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993). 
Thus, "[rjaising an issue [for the first time] in a post-trial motion . . . does not preserve 
that issue for appeal" unless the trial court either takes evidence or holds an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue. Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App. 
1994). Cf. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150,1161 (Utah 1991); State v. Matsamas,S0S P.2d 1048,1052 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Mildenhall, 1M P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987). 
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! r defendant claimed in his motion for new trial that he knew prior to Davis's 
testimony that Davis had "received [the] ledger allegedly created by the defendant 
from the defendant's wife after she had been beatei wever, 
defendant never objected to I );ivis's testimony on the ground that it differed from the 
prosecutor's pre trial representation. Thus, defendant did not properly preserve this claim 
for appeal. See Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551. Moreover, the trial court did not revive this 
claim in defendant's motion for new trial because (lie cuiil denied the motion \N ilhout 
opinion or a hearing. See Estate v. Covington, 888 P.2d at 678. 
Consequently, defendant's perjury claim is not properly preserved, and this Court 
should refuse to consider it. 
In any case, even were defendant's perjury claim piopei ly pi e^Tveil, it laiK 
because defendant has not demonstMlnl thai even assuming Davis testified 
inconsistently, any falsity justifies a new trial. For false testimony to warrant a new trial, 
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered prior to or 
at trial, that the evidence is not "merely cumulative," .mil that the evidence is "'such ,o. to 
render a different lal of the case." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 
793 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Mildenhall, 141 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987) (holding 
that, to warrant new trial based on false testimony, defendant must show (hat I he 
statements were made "with the belief that they \\e»e nuf true" ami dial there is "a 
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reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have substantially affected the verdict"). 
Defendant cannot make that showing here. 
First, defendant stated in his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial 
that he was aware of Davis's alleged false testimony at the time Davis gave it (R. 190). 
Thus, defendant cannot show that the evidence could not have been discovered prior to or 
at trial. See James, 819 P.2d at 793. 
Second, even without the story about defendant's wife, Davis's testimony 
concerning the source of defendant's ledger was sufficiently inconsistent at trial to allow 
defendant to attack Davis's credibility in closing argument (Tr. 514 (arguing that Davis's 
testimony about source of ledger "was nothing more than an undisguised, bald-faced 
lie"); 527-28 (arguing Davis "lied to you"). Thus, any evidence concerning a possible 
third source of the ledger is "merely cumulative." James, 819 P.2d at 793. 
Finally, the evidence establishing defendant's guilt was strong. Thus, testimony 
that Davis obtained a copy of defendant's ledger from defendant's wife after defendant 
had abused her is not the type of evidence that would "render a different result probable 
on the retrial of the case." Id. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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THE FAILURE TO RECORD ONE WITNESS'S TESTIMONY 
OVER THE COURSE OF A FOUR-DAY TRIAL DOES NOT 
WARRANT A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE RECORD HAS BEEN 
PROPERLY SUPPLEMENTED WITH AN AFFIDAVIT FROM 
THAT WITNESS. 
Defendant claims that a new trial is required because the testimony of State 
witness Karin Lane was not recorded due to a malfunction in the trial court's videotape 
equipment. He claims this missing testimony "unconstitutionally prejudice) s | | his | right 
to appeal" because he is challenging the si iffieieiiey n( (he e\ ideneo to support his 
convictions and lUfhe parties luive been unable to recreate either a record of her testimony 
or of the objections thereto." Aplt. Br. at 27, 28. Defendant's claim fails, however, 
where this Court granted the State's unopposed motion to supplemeiil the iccoi J w ifli Ms. 
Lane's affidavit detailing her testimony, and, (he supplemented testimony does not 
undermine (he sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's convictions. 
A. Relevant proceedings. 
Defendant's trial lasted four days (R. 192-94). In all, the State called mm 
witnesses (Tr. 43, 112, 12<>, 1.52, I /<>, I ()5, 258, 3M, 40,.! !> I\,n m I ;me, a Neways 
employee ii I tl le accoi mtii ig department, appeared as the second witness on the first day 
(R. 266). Because of a malfunction in the trial court's recording device, Ms. Lane's 
testimony was not recorded. Hers was the only testimony lost. 
On or about November 5, 1999, defendant filed » Motion to Amend Record 
Pursui. i{ii) oi me Rules of Appellate Procedure with the trial court. (R. 241). 
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In his supporting memorandum, defendant indicated the need to supplement the record 
with Ms. Lane's testimony and suggested that the record could be reconstructed based, in 
part, on notes his counsel had taken during Ms. Lane's testimony (R. 245). 
On or about December 10,1999, the trial court ruled on defendant's motion and 
ordered that "[c]ounsel should work together to prepare an acceptable statement of Ms. 
Lane's testimony to include in the record" (R. 259). 
On September 13, 2000, the State filed a letter with this Court indicating that it 
was enclosing an affidavit signed by Ms. Lane detailing her testimony at trial and that it 
was forwarding a copy of the affidavit to defendant's counsel for a response. Letter dated 
Sept. 13, 2000 (Addendum C). 
On November 13, 2000, having received no response from defendant's counsel, 
the State filed a Motion to Supplement the Record and Memorandum. State's Mot. to 
Supp. (Addendum C). 
On December 4, 2000, this Court granted the State's motion, noting that 
"[a]ppellant did not object or otherwise respond to the motion" (R. 265). 
B. Defendant's claim of an inadequate record fails where the record 
has in fact been properly supplemented. 
Due process and a criminal's constitutional right to appeal "crequire[] that there be 
a record adequate to review specific claims of error.'" West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 
UT App 358, Tf 11,993 P.2d 252 (quoting State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 
1996). 
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I low evet iincc a record has been reconstructed, the defendant must show "that the 
reconstruction procedure was defective," Emig v. Hayward, 703 Wld It 14 3, I (Ml' \\ it a11 
1985), or "explain why an agreed statement of the recou I is not sufficient befon tin- [he] 
is entitled to [relief);' (7/r of Mm ntv v Robinson* K78 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Utah 1994). See 
also Ih'fhtrtment ofCmty. Affairs v. Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Utah 
1980) (holding reconstruction of record adequate where affidavit of witness and affidavit 
of counsel for State "sufficiently cured the defect.. . in view of flic fin ( lh.it m \ laini is 
made that the affidavits arc m error on nn\ material issue"). 
Here, defendant both moved for reconstruction of Ms. Lane's testimony in the trial 
court and indicated that such reconstruction was possible (R. 241, 245). Then, he "did 
not object or otherwise respond" to the State's motion to supplement the ivo »iil with Ms. 
Lane's affidavit (R. 265). htullv, he now hen; challenges this Court's grant of the 
Stale's mi mon »»»supplement, and that supplementation does not undermine defendant's 
convictions. Therefore, the record on appeal properly contains the substance of Ms. 
Lane's testimony. 
Consequently, defent npeal has been violated because 
Ms. Li- • - u imony was not properly recorded fails. 
29 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
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MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
59-1-401. Penalties. 
(1) (a) The penalty for failure to file a tax return within the time prescribed 
by law including extensions is the greater of $20 or 10% of the unpaid tax 
due on the return. 
(b) Subsection (1) does not apply to amended returns. 
(2) The penalty for failure to pay tax due shall be the greater of $20 or 10% 
of the unpaid tax for: 
(a) failure to pay any tax, as reported on a timely filed return; 
(b) failure to pay any tax within 90 days of the due date of the return, 
if there was a late filed return subject to the penalty provided under 
Subsection (lXa); 
(c) failure to pay any tax within 30 days of the date of mailing any notice 
of deficiency of tax unless a petition for redetermination or a request for 
agency action is filed within 30 days of the date of mailing the notice of 
deficiency; 
(d) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date the commission's 
order constituting final agency action resulting from a timely filed petition 
for redetermination or request for agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b); and 
(e) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date of a final judicial 
decision resulting from a timely filed petition for judicial review. 
(3) (a) Beginning January 1, 1995, in the case of any underpayment of 
estimated tax or quarterly installments required by Sections 59-5-107, 
59-5-207, 59-7-504, and 59-9-104, there shall be added a penalty in an 
amount determined by applying the interest rate provided under Section 
59-1-402 plus four percentage points to the amount of the underpayment 
for the period of the underpayment. 
(b) (i) For purposes of Subsection (3Xa), the amount of the underpay-
ment shall be the excess of the required installment over the amount, 
if any, of the installment paid on or before the due date for the 
installment. 
(ii) The period of the underpayment shall run from the due date for 
the installment to whichever of the following dates is the earlier: 
(A) the original due date of the tax return, without extensions, 
for the taxable year; or 
(B) with respect to any portion of the underpayment, the date 
on which that portion is paid. 
(iii) For purposes of this Subsection (3), a payment of estimated tax 
shall be credited against unpaid required installments in the order in 
which the installments are required to be paid. 
(4) (a) In case of an extension of time to file an individual income tax or 
corporate franchise tax return, if the lesser of 90% of the total tax reported 
on the tax return or 100% of the prior year's tax is not paid by the due date 
of the return, not including extensions, a 2% per month penalty shall apply 
on the unpaid tax during the period of extension. 
(b) If a return is not filed within the extension time period as provided 
in Section 59-7-505 or 59-10-516, penalties as provided in Subsection (1) 
and Subsection (2Kb) shall be added in lieu of the penalty assessed under 
this subsection as if no extension of time for filing a return had been 
granted. 
(5) (a) Additional penalties for underpayments of tax are as follows: 
(i) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence, the penalty is 
10% of the underpayment. 
(ii) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional disregard of 
law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the underpayment. 
(iii) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 
per period or 50% of the tax due. 
(iv) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to evade the 
tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per period or 100% of the 
underpayment. 
(b) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a penalty 
imposed under Subsection (ii), (iii), or (iv), the commission shall notify the 
taxpayer of the proposed penalty. 
(i) The notice of proposed penalty shall: 
(A) set forth the basis of the assessment; and 
(B) be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the 
person's last-known address. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the notice of proposed penalty, the person 
against whom the penalty is proposed may: 
(A) pay the amount of the proposed penalty at the place and 
time stated in the notice; or 
(B) proceed in accordance with the review procedures of Sub-
section (iii). 
(iii) Any person against whom a penalty has been proposed in 
accordance with this subsection may contest the proposed penalty by 
filing a petition for an adjudicative proceeding with the commission. 
(iv) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a 
penalty under this subsection, the commission shall assess the 
penalty and give notice and demand for payment. The notice and 
demand for payment shall be mailed by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, to the person's last-known address. 
(6) The penalty for failure to file an information return or a complete 
supporting schedule is $50 for each return or schedule up to a maximum of 
$1,000. 
(7) If any taxpayer, in furtherance of a frivolous position, has a prima facie 
intent to delay or impede administration of the tax law and files a piuported 
return that fails to contain information from which the correctness of reported 
tax liability can be determined or that clearly indicates that the tax liability 
shown must be substantially incorrect, the penalty is $500. 
(8) For monthly payment of sales and use taxes under Section 59-12-108, in 
addition to any other penalties for late payment, a vendor may not retain a 
percentage of sales and use taxes collected as otherwise allowable under 
Section 59-12-108. 
(9) As provided in Section 76-8-1101, the following are criminal penalties: 
(a) Any person who is required by this title or any laws the commission 
administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from 
the commission, or who operates without having registered or secured a 
license or permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit 
is expired or not current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $500 nor more 
than $1,000. 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of this 
title or any lawful requirement of the commission, fails to make, render, 
sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the time 
required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty 
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
(d) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this 
section is six years from the date the tax should have been remitted. 
(10) Upon making a record of its actions, and upon reasonable cause shown, 
the commission may waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or 
interest imposed under this part. 
76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion — 
Statute of limitations. 
(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401: 
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or 
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having 
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the 
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is 
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, 
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the 
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty 
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is 
six years from the date the tax should have been remitted. 
76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
ADDENDUM B 
"»»*• JudiQicci Christ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANES L. THOMPSON, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 981905483 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant JAMES L. THOMPSON is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN and WILLFUL EVASION OF 
INCOME TAX . The Information alleges: 
COUNT I 
MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN, a Third Degree Felony, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or before 15 April 1997 in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 
401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that JAMES L. 
THOMPSON, with intent to evade a tax or requirement of Title 59 or 
lawful requirement of the commission, made, rendered, signed or 
verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied 
false or fraudulent information on his 1996 Utah State Individual 
Income Tax Return* 
COUNT II 
WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or before 15 April 1997 in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, 
Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that JAMES 
L. THOMPSON, willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the 
payment thereof due on his income earned in 1996. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
It is my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case, and it is 
your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are presented by the allegations in 
the Information filed in this court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty." You should perform 
this duty uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion or prejudice against the defendant 
because of the fact that he has been arrested for this offense, or because charges have been filed 
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to stand trial. None of these facts is 
evidence of his guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them 
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence legally introduced in this trial and the law 
as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the 
defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously 
and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. The verdict 
must express the individual opinion of each juror. 
INSTRUCTION NO. A 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the weight and effect of the evidence, but 
you must determine the facts from the evidence received here in Court. 
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not speculate as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was rejected, or any 
evidence that was stricken out by the Court; such matter is to be treated as though you had never 
heard it and must be entirely disregarded. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _/__ 
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony of witnesses, exhibits 
received by the Court, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from facts 
proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in these instructions, and all of the facts 
and circumstances disclosed thereby. Statements of either counsel are not evidence and should 
not be considered as such by you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
If, during this trial, I have said or done anything which has suggested to you that I am 
inclined to favor the claims or position of either party, you will not permit yourselves to be 
influenced by any such suggestion. 
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of 
belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate an opinion 
relating to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judge of 
the facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. "Reasonable doubt" means a doubt that is based on reason and one which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must be reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise 
from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. G 
The State of Utah has filed an Information charging the defendant as follows: 
COUNT 1 
The defendant, James L. Thompson, on or before April 15, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, committed the crime of Filing a False Tax Return, a violation of Title 76, Chapter 
8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
Third Degree Felony, as follows: that at the time and place stated above, the defendant, with 
intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement 
or supplied false or fraudulent information on his 1996 Utah State Individual Income Tax 
Return. 
COUNT 2 
The defendant, James L. Thompson, on or before April 15, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, committed the crime of Willful Evasion of Income Tax, a violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, a Second Degree Felony, as follows: that at the time and place aforesaid, the 
defendant, willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment of taxes due on his income 
earned in 1996, as was required by law to be paid. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant has entered pleas of not guilty to the charges against 
him. The pleas of not guilty deny each and all of the essential allegations of the charges 
contained in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and all of the 
essential allegations to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 0 
Proof of Precise Amount of Tax Owed Not Necessary 
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, James L. Thompson, 
willfully attempted to evade or defeat a portion of the tax owed. 
Although the State must prove a willful attempt to evade a portion of tax, the State is not 
required to prove the precise amount of additional tax that may have been evaded or the precise 
amount of additional tax owed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
Consider Each Count Separately 
A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your 
verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count. Failure to File a tax 
return is a separate charge from willful evasion of taxes. Each charge should be considered 
separately, even if they are for the same year. 
INSTRUCTION NO./{Q 
Caution - Punishment 
Single Defendant — Multiple Counts 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the charged offenses should not affect your verdict as 
to any other charged offense. 
I caution you, members of the jury, that you are here to determine from the evidence in 
this case whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The defendant is on trial only for those 
specific offenses alleged in the information. 
Also, the question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in 
deciding the case. If the defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the judge to 
determine. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ff 
Filing a False Return - Nature of the Offense Charged 
Count One of the information charges that the defendant, James L. Thompson, was 
required by law to file a true and accurate Utah State Individual Income Tax Return for the tax 
year 199$, on or before April 15, 1997, and that the defendant, with intent to evade a tax, a 
requirement of the Utah Tax Code or a lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied false or 
fraudulent information on his return. 
INSTRUCTION N O / " ^ 
Filing a False or Fraudulent Return — Statute 
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101(b) and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401(9)(b) of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in part that: 
Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any 
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or 
verify any return or to supply any information within the time required under this 
title, or who makes renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or 
statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information is guilty of a third 
degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less 
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000. 
INSTRUCTION NO./*? 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of Filing a False or Fraudulent Tax 
Return if that person, with the intent to evade; 
i) any tax; or 
ii) requirement of the Utah State Tax Code; or 
iii) lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission; 
was required by law to make, render, sign or verify a Utah State Individual Income Tax Return, 
but made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied 
false or fraudulent information on his return for any given taxable year. 
INSTRUCTION NO. •' 
Filing a False or Fraudulent Return 
The Essential Elements of the Offense Charged 
Before you can convict the defendant James L. Thompson of the crime of filing a 
false or fraudulent tax return, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, 
you must find from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That he filed an Individual Utah Income Tax Return with the Utah State Tax 
Commission concerning his income for the taxable year ending December 31, 1996; 
2. That he filed a tax return knowing it contained false information; and; 
3. That he acted with intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful 
requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission and not as a result of accident or negligence. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of all of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant guilty. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense 
of Filing a False or Fraudulent tax return as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. j % 
Proof Of One False Item Enough 
The indictment charges in Count One that the defendant's income tax return for the year 
1996 was false or fraudulent. 
You are instructed that it is sufficient if you find that the government has established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that any one item was knowingly falsely or fraudulently reported on 
the defendant's return. In other words, the government does not have to prove that all of the 
items on which they offer evidence are false or fraudulent: proof of the falsity of a single item is 
sufficient. On the other hand, if you find that none of these items was falsely or fraudulently 
reported on the defendant's return, then you should acquit the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO.Ifj 
Omission of Matter 
An income tax return may be false not only because of a knowing misstatement of a 
matter on the return, but also because of a knowing omission of a matter on the return. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / " 7 
When Offense Completed 
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the defendant 
filed a 1 Ise or Fraudulent Utah State Individual Income Tax Return and that this was done with 
intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State 
Tax Commission as charged in Count One of the Information, then you may find that the offense 
charged was complete on the date after each return was filed or anytime thereafter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / g ^ 
Intent 
The third and final element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
to establish the offense of Filing a False or Fraudulent Utah State Income Tax Return is that the 
defendant's alleged filing of a false or fraudulent return was "with intent to evade a tax, 
requirement of the Utah Tax laws or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission." 
This "intent" means a voluntary, intentional attempt, act or omission, to evade a tax, 
requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Such intent in the context of a filing a false or fraudulent income tax return, simply means a 
voluntary, intentional act, omission, or effort by the defendant to not pay a tax he would 
otherwise be required to pay or failure to perform an obligation he would otherwise be required 
to perform under the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
INSTRUCTION NO. M 
Intent - Acts 
To find the defendant guilty of violating Section 76-8-1101 and Section 59-1-401, you 
must not only find that he did the acts or failed to do the acts of which he stands charged, but you 
must also find that these actions were done by him with intent to evade a tax, requirement of the 
Utah Tax laws or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The word "intent," as used in this statute, means a voluntary, conscious desire to engage 
in conduct that is a violation of a known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have 
acted or failed to have acted when the law required him to act voluntarily and intentionally and 
with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited, or with specific intent to fail 
to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to 
disregard the law. 
In determining the issue of intent, you are entitled to consider anything done or omitted to 
be done by the defendant and all facts and circumstances in evidence that may aid in the 
determination of his state of mind. It is obviously impossible to ascertain or prove directly the 
operations of the defendant's mind; but a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence in any case may enable one to infer what another's 
intentions were in doing or not doing things. With the knowledge of definite acts, we may draw 
definite logical conclusions. 
We are, in our daily affairs, continuously called upon to decide from the acts of others 
what their intentions or purposes are, and experience has taught us that frequently, actions speak 
more clearly than spoken or written words. To this extent, you must rely in part on 
circumstantial evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
In this regard, there are certain matters that you may consider as pointing to intent, if you 
find such matters to exist in this case. By way of illustration only, intent to evade may be 
inferred from conduct such as handling ones affairs to avoid making records usual in transactions 
of the kind, such as failing to record sales in order to pay sales tax, and any conduct the likely 
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal. 
I give you these instances simply to illustrate the type of conduct you may consider in 
determining the issue of willfulness. I do not by this instruction mean to imply that the 
defendant did engage in any such conduct. It is for you as the trier of the facts to make this 
determination as to whether the defendant did or did not. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^Q 
Knowledge of Falsehood 
(Deliberate Ignorance) 
The fact of knowledge may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, just as 
any other fact in the case. 
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately "closed his eyes" to what would otherwise have 
been obvious to him. 
A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment 
would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact 
may be inferred from proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his deliberate blindness to the existence 
of the fact. 
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate "closing of the eyes," and the 
inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. Although knowledge may be inferred from the 
defendant's behavior, the issue is what the defendant actually knew or may have "closed his 
eyes" to avoid. A showing of an unintentional mistake, carelessness, negligence, even gross 
negligence or recklessness is not sufficient to support a finding of intent to evade or knowledge. 
INSTRUCTION NO.ff / 
A person acts: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION N O . ^ p 
Failure To Pay — Willfulness Defined 
The specific intent of willfulness is an essential element of the offense of willful failure to 
pay one's income taxes. The term willfully used in connection with this offense means a 
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. 
The failure to pay income taxes is willful if the defendant's act or failure to act was 
voluntary and purposeful and with the specific intent to fail to do what he knew the law requires 
to be done; that is to say, with intent to disobey or disregard the law that requires him to pay 
Utah State Income Taxes. 
On the other hand, the defendant's conduct is not willful if you find that he failed to pay 
his income taxes because of negligence (even gross negligence), inadvertence, accident, mistake, 
or reckless disregard for the requirements of the law, or due to his honest misunderstanding of 
the requirements of the law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 3 
Tax Evasion — Nature of Offense Charged 
Count Two of the information charges that the defendant, James L. Thompson, who 
during the calender year 1996 resided in the State of Utah, willfully attempted to evade or defeat 
a part of the income tax due and owing by him or a payment thereof to the State of Utah for the 
calendar year 1996, by failing to report all of his taxable income for said calender year or by 
taking improper deductions, either of which would affect the amount of taxes owed; and the 
defendant knew he failed to report the income or took the improper deductions and that he would 
owe more tax than he paid. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ?*/ 
Statute Defining Offense 
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code 
Annotated provides, in part, that: 
Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment 
thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree 
felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than 
$1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Willful Tax Evasion - The Essential Elements 
of the Offense Charged 
Before you can convict the defendant, James L. Thompson, of the crime of 
Willful Evasion of Income Tax, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the 
Information, you must find from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or before April 15,1997, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
James L. Thompson, owed a tax on his 1996 income; 
2. That he attempted to evade the tax; and; 
3. That he acted willfully. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of all of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant guilty. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense 
of Willful Evasion of Income Tax as charged in Count 2 of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. W > 
Elements of Attempt - To Evade or Defeat a Tax 
To establish the offense of attempting to evade or defeat a tax, the State is required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements: 
First, an iacome tax was due and owing from the defendant in addition to what had been 
paid, if anything; 
Second, an affirmative attempt, in any manner, to evade or defeat an income tax or 
payment thereof, and 
Third, the defendant acted willfully. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 
essential element of the crime charged; the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal 
case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 7 
Tax Deficiency 
One element of attempted tax evasion is a tax deficiency or, in other words, an amount of 
State Income Tax due and owing by the defendant over and above the amount of tax paid by the 
defendant. Each year must be considered separately. In other words, the defendant's tax 
obligation in any one year must be determined separately from his obligations in any other year. 
The defendant is charged with failing to pay an amount of tax due for the calender year 
1996 as alleged in the Information. The proof need not show, however, a precise amount or all 
of the additional tax due. The State is only required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant attempted to evade some income tax. An amount is defined as a material amount 
or more than just a nominal amount. It is a real amount, not an imaginary amount. 
INSTRUCTION NO. j g ^ 
To "Attempt to Evade or Defeat" a Tax - Explained 
The phrase "attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment of taxes due" 
contemplates and charges that the defendant James L. Thompson knew and understood that 
during the calender year 1996, he owed more Utah State Income Tax than had been paid for that 
year and then tried in some way to avoid that additional tax. 
In order to show an "attempt to evade or defeat any tax", therefore, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant James L. Thompson intended to evade or defeat a tax 
due, and that the defendant James L. Thompson also willfully did some affirmative act or 
willfully failed to do some act required of him by law in order to accomplish this intent to evade 
or defeat a tax. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,*^ To show willfulness the State must also show that the 
Defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was wrongful. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ? 
Willfulness 
To find the defendant guilty of violating Section 76-8-1101 and Section 59-1-401, you 
must not only find that he did the acts of which he stands charged, but you must also find that he 
acted willfully. 
The word "willfully," as used in this statute, means a voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have acted voluntarily and intentionally 
and with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited, or with specific intent to 
fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to 
disregard the law. 
In determining the issue of willfulness, you are entitled to consider anything done or 
omitted to be done by the defendant and all facts and circumstances in evidence that may aid in 
the determination of his state of mind. It is obviously impossible to ascertain or prove directly 
the operations of the defendant's mind; but a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence in any case may enable one to infer what another's 
intentions were in doing or not doing things. With the knowledge of definite acts, we may draw 
definite logical conclusions. 
We are, in our daily affairs, continuously called upon to decide from the acts of others 
what their intentions or purposes are, and experience has taught us that frequently, actions speak 
more clearly than spoken or written words. To this extent, you may rely in part on circumstantial 
evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
In this regard, there are certain matters that you may consider as pointing to willfulness, if 
you find such matters to exist in this case. By way of illustration only, willfulness may be 
inferred from conduct such as handling ones affairs to avoid making records usual in transactions 
of the kind, such as failing to record sales in order to pay sales tax, and any conduct the likely 
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal 
I give you these instances simply to illustrate the type of conduct you may consider in 
determining the issue of willfulness. I do not by this instruction mean to imply that the 
defendant did engage in any such conduct. It is for you as the trier of the facts to make this 
determination as to whether the defendant did or did not. 
INSTRUCTION N O ^ / To find the Defendant guilty of willful evasion of income 
tax by the Defendant with regard to his 1996 tax return in violation of Title 76 Chapter 8 
Section 1101 and Title 59 Chapter 1 Section 401 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1955, as 
amended, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's actions 
were intentional and willful. That in fact the Defendant underpaid his taxes for the tax year 
1996 and that he made an affirmative act constituting an evasion or an attempted evasion of 
the tax. 
-3-
INSTRUCTION N o 2 2 l 
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the defendant 
evaded a tax and that this was done willfully as charged in Count Two of the Information, then 
you may find that the offense charged was complete on the date after the tax was due or anytime 
thereafter. A tax is due when the return should have been filed and the person who was required 
to make the return is also required to pay the tax at the time the return was due. No notice or 
assessment from the Utah State Tax Commission is necessary for the taxpayer to be required to 
pay the tax. 
INSTRUCTION NO ^ 3 A tax return is not criminally fraudulent simply because 
it is erroneous. 
-7-
INSTRUCTION NO ^ To find the Defendant guilty of either of the crimes 
alleged by the State of Utah, it is not enough to show merely that a lessor tax was paid than 
was due, nor is negligent, careless, or unintentional understatement of income sufficient. 
-8-
INSTRUCTION NO. j § 3 
When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of your number as foreperson. 
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and when found must be returned by 
you into court. 
Your verdicts in this case must be either GUILTY or NOT GUILTY as to each single 
count in the Information. Thus, the verdict must be either: 
GUILTY as charged of Count One, or 
NOT GUILTY of Count One. 
and 
GUILTY as charged of Count Two, or 
NOT GUILTY of Count Two. 
This is a criminal case and it requires a unanimous agreement of all the jurors to find a verdict. 
ADDENDUM C 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
atlitO 1 .fvoros@state.ut.us 
Counsel for the State of Utah 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, STATE'S MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
vs. and MEMORANDUM 
JAMES L. THOMPSON, Case No. 990437 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
MOTION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State of Utah 
moves this Court to supplement the record on appeal with the affidavit of Karin Lane, the 
onginal of which was filed with this Court on 13 September 2000. A copy is attached as 
exhibit B. 
MEMORANDUM 
Supplementation is appropriate here. Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, provides: 
If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled 
by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything 
material to either party is omitted from the record by error or 
accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or 
the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if 
necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. 
The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall 
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days 
after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. 
All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be 
presented to the appellate court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Something material to a party was omitted from the record on appeal in this case: 
the testimony of State's witness Karin Hale. Apparently, it was not recorded. In a motion 
to supplement filed in district court, defendant stated, "Defendant hereby submits that the 
record fails to truly disclose what occurred in the trial court inasmuch as Ms. Lane's 
testimony has been omitted." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Record 
Pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure at 2. The trial court directed 
2 
counsel to "work together to prepare an acceptable statement of Ms. Lane's testimony to 
include in the record." Minute Entry dated 10 December 1999, attached as exhibit A. 
After repeated inquiries from this Court concerning the status of the record 
supplementation, the State had Ms. Hale prepare an affidavit detailing her testimony that 
was omitted from the record on appeal. See exhibit B. On 13 September 2000, the State 
filed the original of this affidavit with this Court and pursuant to rule 11(h) served a copy 
on defense counsel with a cover letter stating in part: "With defendant's stipulation, this 
affidavit should complete the record and permit this case to move forward. By copy of 
this letter, with attachment, I invite Mr. Black to stipulate to this procedure or, if he feels 
the affidavit is materially inaccurate, to contact me.'* Letter dated 13 September 2000, 
attached as exhibit C. 
Rule 11(h) specifies, "Within 10 days after service, any party may serve 
objections to the proposed changes.'* To date defendant has served no objections to the 
proposed affidavit nor communicated with the State concerning it. Accordingly, the State 
requests this Court to supplement the record on appeal with the affidavit of Karin Lane. 
DATED: [^November2000. 
J, JR. 
isistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Motion to 
Supplement the Record was mailed by first class mail this fcO November 2000 to the 
following: 
David 0. Black 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
Williamsburg Office Park 
5806 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
Wft UWR 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
>fiiA 
Plaintiff, 
Vs 
ftnt/?iiht 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. f / Z f J ^ V f J 
The Plaintiffs i Defendant's 
Motion )4? A-icc&itcP fc<?zcP 
Is )( Granted Denied. 
>mments: ^ * « < ^ / Mt<frJ <? ty^U. mjfzjfC^ ^ 
/statu'$ 4t&h<44£fr<u-t ^g tu<zM/dL? ^ t<<* 
Plaintiff A. .Defendant To Prepare Order. 
Dated /<D day of QdtuA— , 1999 
"zlM^ (, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Exhibit B 
State of Utah ) 
:ss 
County of Utah )' 
I, Karin Lane, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over 18 yean of age, and have personal knowledge of the facts contained in 
this Affidavit 
2. . I am employed in the accounting department for Neways, Inc. 
3. I was called to testify in a trial, State v. Thompson which took place December 
14-17,1998. 
4. I was asked to testify concerning my knowledge regarding James Thompson, who 
had worked at Neways in their legal department 
5. I was first questioned by the attorney for the State of Utah. 
6. I was asked questions and responded as follows. 
7. What is my name, Karin Lane. Who is my employer, Neways, Inc. in Salem, 
Utah. How long I have I worked there, October 1994 to the present What are my duties at 
Neways, I began as an accounting clerk in charge of bank reconciliations and general ledger 
duties but I am here as the custodian of records. 
8. I was asked to look at numerous checks and check request forms from Neways 
which I identified and recognized the handwriting as belonging to Annette Jenkins and James 
Thompson. 
9. I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they 
reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course 
G.\ WadrtlarmliotiflWavrt. wpd 
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of 
these questions. 
10. I stated that Annette Jenkins had worked with James Thompson on issuing checks 
for Mr. Thompson. 
11. I believe these documents were admitted into evidence. 
12. I was asked to look at several W-2 forms from Neways and A+ Benefits which I 
identified. 
13. I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they 
reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular coune 
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of 
these questions. 
14. I believe these documents were admitted into evidence. 
15. I was asked to look at some IRS 1099 forms from Neways which I identified and 
stated that these particular 1099*s had been prepared by Craig Spencer who worked in our 
accounting department 
16. I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they 
reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course 
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of 
these questions. 
17. I believe these documents were admitted into evidence. 
18. I was asked to look at some bi-weekly payroll forms from Neways to James 
Thompson which I identified 
G.\Wadt\karmiaMtfRdavit wpd 
19. I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they 
reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course 
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of 
these questions. 
20. I believe these documents were admitted into evidence. 
21. I was asked how frequently employees were paid at Neways and responded, every 
two weeks. 
22. I was asked how much Mr. Thompson was paid in salary when he started in 
October of 1995 and I responded I had calculated that to be S60.000.20 annually and showed the 
calculation I had made on a sheet of paper. This document was ^ft*"^ into evidence. 
23. I was asked if that salary was reduced in February of 1996 and I responded that a 
calculation of his W-2's for 1996 snowed he had been paid through paychecks $23,148.81 since 
February 1996, not the S60.000.20 which was his salary in 1995. 
24. I was asked if the pay amount Mr. Thompson received in paychecks ever changed 
again while he was at Neways after mis February drop in pay and I stated I didn't think so. 
25. I was asked if Mr. Thompson received a raise in salary in May of 1996 and March 
of 1997 and I responded I wasn't sure. 
26. The attorney for James Thompson then asked me questions. 
27. I was asked if Mr. Thompson's reduction in salary in February of 1996 coincided 
with Neways starting with a new payroll services company named A+ Benefits. I stated that 
according to the records, Mr. Thompson's salary was reduced the first part of February 1996 and 
Neways didn't switch to A+ Benefits, the new payroll service, until the last week of March or the 
O:\WafcUonalaMiBdivitwp4 
first week of April of 1996. 
28. I was asked if I kept a record of the payments made to third parties on behalf of 
Mr. Thompson and I responded I did not. The only record there would be was a folder of the 
check request forms that Annette Jenkins was keeping and the computerized general ledger 
which shows all the checks issued by Neways. The only ledger of these specific payments I had 
even heard about was the one kept by James Thompson in his day planner. 
29. I was asked if I had reviewed the checks to see if they were supposed to be on the 
1099 or not and whether they may have been business expenses or not and I answered that this 
had been done by Craig Spencer, Dee Mower and Annette Jenkins. 
30. I was asked if I knew if the W-2's and the 1099*$ were accurate and I said I didn't 
prepare them but as far as I knew they were accurate and the W-2's were prepared the same way 
as all the other W-2's were prepared. 
31. I was asked if I was aware of an embezzlement investigation involving Craig 
Spencer and responded that Craig Spencer had reported a suspicious check for cash that he 
thought was taken by Annette Jenkins which was investigated by Allen Davis and James 
Thompson. 
32. I was asked how I had made copies of me checks that had been presented and I 
answered I did not make the actual copies, someone else at Neways had made them. 
33. The attorney for the State asked me some more questions to which I responded. 
34. I was asked if Mr. Thompson's reduction in pay in early February had anything to 
do with the change in the payroll service company in late March and I responded that it did not. 
35. I was asked if other employees did work for related Neways companies and I said 
GAWi*MwtateHffldtvn.wpd 
yes. 
36. I was asked if any other employee's pay with third party beneficiaries was 
handled similarly to James Thompson's and I stated no. 
37. I was asked if I knew the results of the embezzlement investigation that was 
conducted by James Thompson and Allen Davis and I responded I understood Annette Jenkins 
was paying back the amount they believe was taken. 
38. The attorney for Mr. Thompson then asked me some questions. 
i 39.) He asked if I thought the 1099*8 and W-2's were accurate and I responded again 
that I didn't prepare them but as far as I knew, they were correct 
40. My testimony ended and I was then excused from the trial. 
DATED this 23* day of August, 2000. 
KarurLane 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 1st dayxif September, 
G iWMWtwill—ifllilmil npil 
Exhibit C 
STATE OF UTAH 
O F F I C E O F T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FILED 
Utmh Court of Appeals 
SEP 1 3 : : : } 
Pautotte Stagg 
Citric o* too Court 
JAMES R SOPEA REEO RtCHAAOS 
Ch*i Otputy Attomty G*uoi 
13 September 2000 
PALMER DEPAULIS 
Oirector of Public Policy A Communications 
Hand-delivered 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
Post Office Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Thompson, Case No. 990437-CA 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
I am following up on my letter to you of 31 August 2000. 
Enclosed is an original affidavit of trial witness Karin Lane detailing the 
testimony that was omitted from the record on appeal in the above-referenced case. 
With defendant's stipulation, this affidavit should complete the record and permit 
this case to move forward. By copy of this letter, with attachment, I invite Mr. 
Black to stipulate to this procedure or, if he feels the affidavit is materially 
inaccurate, to contact me. 
VOROS,JR. 
istant Attorney General 
copy: David O. Black, attorney for defendant/appellant 
Wade Winegar, trial prosecutor 
